How Do Rights Become Real?: Formal and Informal Institutions in South Africa's Land Reform by Cousins, Ben
1 Introduction
How do legally defined rights to resources become
effective command over those resources? What are
the limits to social change through legal reform?
These questions are having to be confronted, often
painfully, by rural people, land activists and gov-
ernment officials involved in South Africas post-
apartheid land reform, central components of
which comprise ambitious and wide-ranging
'rights-based' laws and programmes. Two central
issues are: supplementing the passing of new legis-
lation with the detailed design of programmes to
implement these laws, and the interplay of formal
and informal institutions in the complex social are-
nas within which people actually live. The environ-
mental entitlements framework helps us to explore
these questions. Their wider relevance is outlined
by McAuslan (1996), who asserts that legal reforms
can restructure land relations more generally, and
who finds the South African rights-based approach
persuasive'.
2 A Rights-Based Land Reform:
Problems and Prospects
South Africa's post-apartheid government has
embarked on a wide-ranging and ambitious pro-
gramme of land reform, designed to redress the
legacy of centuries of dispossession, racially
defined and discriminatory legal frameworks and
deep rural poverty The three principal components
of land reform are a market-assisted redistribution
programme, restitution of land to people who were
dispossessed by racially discriminatory legislation
or practice, and a tenure reform programme aimed
at creating tenure security within a variety of tenure
systems. Both restitution and tenure reform are
'rights-based', with new laws creating the basis for
claims to land and resources. Elements of the redis-
tribution programme involve new legal regimes
which specify the rights and duties of the benefi-
ciaries of land reform (e.g. within the legal entities
which allow groups to jointly own and control
land). Gender equality, provided for by South
Africa's new Constitution, is a central goal of land
reform (Department of Land Affairs 1997: 17).
Laws creating new land rights are thus a central
feature of the new policy framework.
This is significant given that McAuslan has been
involved in drafting new land legislation in Tanzania.
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Critics of the governments land reform programme
characterise it as 'minimálit', pointing to the
compromises which were agreed in the negotiations
preceding the 1994 elections. These saw the inclu-
sion of a Property Clause in the new Constitution
which limits the powers of government to expro-
priate land, the limiting of land restitution to those
cases which occurred after 1913, and the adoption
of a market-based programme of redistribution
which some assert will fail to address the land needs
of the poor and marginalised (National Land
Committee 1995; Levin and Weiner 1997). For the
critics, the state should be more directly involved in
acquiring and redistributing land to those in need,
and should have greater freedom to do so. The
compromised and constrained policy framework is
seen to limit the usefulness of rights-based laws
(Bernstein 1997), and the adoption of this 'legalis-
tic' approach is sometimes perceived as an expres-
sion of the historical weakness of rural popular
organisation in South Africa.
The prospects at present for an expanded and more
interventionist role for the state in land reform are
slim2. This means that for the majority of the rural
population much will depend on the efficacy of the
rights-based laws and programmes currently being
enacted and implemented. A central question is
thus: how can government policies and pro-
grammes ensure that 'rights in law' become 'rights
in reality'? The latter will entail rural South Africans
actively making use of new legal frameworks to suc-
cessfully press their claims to land and natural
resources - on a daily basis within their livelihood
systems and strategies, in gaining access to new
land via government programmes or the market, in
legitimate and functioning systems of inheritance
and transfer, and in defending those rights against
the (unlawful) claims of others. It will therefore
bring together de jure and defactorights and duties
in relation to land, and transcend, in daily practice,
the radical disjunction between the two that is still
the chief characteristic of black land tenure systems
in South Africa (see Cross 1991 for a graphic
description). Land reform must thus make provi-
sion for the effective implementation of the new
rights-based laws, or the rights defined so precisely
The recent adoption by government of a macro-
economic policy framework (GEAR), which gives
priority to massive reductions in state expenditure and a
radical downsizing of the civil service, offers little hope
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in neatly printed Government Gazettes will be little
more than 'paper tigers', and toothless ones at that.
What are the conditions required for effective
implementation? In the South African context the
following can be identified:
adequate information on land rights; this
implies effective communication of legal reforms to
potential beneficiaries;
institutional capacity (inside and outside gov-
ernment) to advise and support rights-holders and
facilitate their active use of the law;
accessible and efficient systems to record and
register rights;
in case of disputes, access to the courts, or
alternative conflict resolution mechanisms;
(y) an integrated and functional system of land
administration at different levels of government
(which can perform many of the functions listed
here).
Given the crisis of capacity currently experienced
by the South African state, these conditions of effec-
tive bureaucracy are somewhat daunting; however,
they do not fully define the problem. Two further
dimensions need to be considered: the first is that
of the content and strength of the rights defined in
law, and thus of the terrain of struggle within which
these rights-based laws are drafted and then
enacted; the second is that of how these formally
defined rights intersect and interact with other
institutional frameworks, both formal and informal,
in the real world contexts of the prospective rights-
holders. Both centrally involve issues of power,
authority and contestation, and require us to consider
law as only one source of rule-making in society
3 Rules and Practices: Formal and
Informal Institutions
The environmental entitlements framework elabo-
rates a disaggregated view of institutions which
mediate access to and use of natural resources
(Leach et aI. 1997; this Bulletin). The approach
moves from a critique of much of the new institu-
tionalist economics as functionalist and hence
of an expanded role for the state in land reform in the
forseeable future; if anything, a cut in the land reform
budget is more likely
tautologous in its premises towards a perspective
which distinguishes between rules and practices,
and explores the relationships between them.
Points of departure include Ostrom (1986), who
views rules as prescribing room for manoeuvre
rather than determining behaviour, and Gore
(1993), who analyses the 'unruly social practices'
which often challenge legal rules of entitlement to
resources. This points towards the contested (and
indeterminate) nature of institutional orders, and
their embeddedness within unequal and dynamic
social relations.
A key distinction is that between formal and infor-
mal institutions. Formal institutions, put simply, are
those backed by the law, implying enforcement of
rules by the state, while informal institutions are
upheld by mutual agreement, or by relations of
power or authority, and rules are thus enforced
endogenously (Leach et al. 1997: 26). Some refer to
the latter as socially accepted moral rules, which
constitute an alternative 'moral economy' (Gore
1993; Thompson 1991; Scott 1976).
How do formal and informal institutions relate to
one other? Gore (1993), in his discussion of Sen's
entitlements theory of famine, suggests that they
coexist, but also interact in a complex and dynamic
manner. He cites Sally Falk Moore (1975), who
asserts that reglementory processes ('all those
attempts to organise and control behaviour through
the use of explicit rules') take place at a multiplicity
of levels within society, and within a variety of social
fields. Numerous conflicting or competing rule-
orders exist, characterised more often than not by
'ambiguities, inconsistencies, gaps, conflicts and the
like' (Falk Moore 1975: 3). In times of crisis (e.g.
famines) informal rule-orders can take precedence
over legal property rights as rules of entitlement to
food or other commodities (Thompson 1991).
In this 'extended' view of entitlements the relation-
ship between formal and informal institutions can
only be understood by referring to the rule/practice
distinction, and in terms of an analysis of power
and the politics of meaning. Falk Moore refers to
the 'continuous making and reiterating of social and
symbolic order., as an active process.... existing
orders are endlessly vulnerable to being unmade,
remade and transformed' (ibid.: 6; Gore 1993:
453). Institutional analysis must therefore include
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both a structural analysis of complexes of rule-
orders (i.e. 'questions of domination/autonomy,
hierarchy/equivalence, proliferation/reduction,
amalgamation/division, replication/diversification
in the relations within and among the constitutive
levels and units', Falk Moore 1975: 28), and also a
processual and actor-oriented analysis of struggle,
of action which is 'choice making, discretionary,
manipulative, sometimes inconsistent, and some-
times conflictual' (Falk Moore 1975: 3).
The environmental entitlements approach calls for
analysis of both formal and informal institutions at
the micro-, the meso- and the macro-levels, and of
relationships between levels (Leach et al. 1997: 26).
In the context of community-based resource man-
agement, institutions mediating resource use need
to be located within a complex institutional
'matrix', which links the position of social actors at
the micro-level to the macro-level conditions which
prevail in the wider political economy context.
Including an analysis of power and difference as
central issues allows us to see that these matrices are
likely to be very messy, and characterised by the
'gaps, ambiguities and conflicts' highlighted by Falk
Moore.
The complexity of both the structural and the
processual dimensions, as well as the need to
always focus on both aspects simultaneously, is well
illustrated in South Africa's tenure reform pro-
gramme. The notion of 'messy matrices' of institu-
tiOns could help to inform the difficult choices
inherent in policy making and implementation.
4 Tenure Reform: A Terrain of
Struggle Over Rights
The challenge to make rights real is at the heart of
the tenure reform component of South Africa's land
reform. This programme attempts to address the
systemic insecurity of tenure of black South
Africans which is the result of a labyrinthine maze
of discriminatory legislation which drastically cir-
cumscribed both the areas in which blacks were
allowed to hold land rights, and the form of those
rights. Instead of ownership, they were issued with
permits or leases, while the land belonged to the
state (or state bodies), as 'trustees'. Communal
tenure systems were subjected to the imposition of
pro-government traditional leaders (and then to
abuse and corruption by these elites), to authoritar-
ian forms of land use planning and resettlement,
and to attempts at privatisation. Women are dis-
criminated against within all tenure systems. Farm-
workers are particularly vulnerable as are farm
dwellers (those who occupy commercial farmland
because they have nowhere else to go, but have no
recognised rights as workers or tenants).
Inadequate institutional support has been provided
to all these 'second class' systems of black land
rights, creating internal disorder and administrative
chaos (Claassens 1995; Department of Land Affairs
1997).
In addition, tenure problems have been exacerbated
by forced removals and other apartheid policies
which resulted in the extreme overcrowding of land
in black townships, the so-called 'homelands', and
those areas of black-owned freehold land which
managed to survive the onslaught of the state. This
means that tenure rights are often overlapping and
conflicting. The holders of prior rights were forced
to accommodate thousands of 'refugees from
apartheid', who were sometimes told by state offi-
cials that they had been awarded this land in com-
pensation, or who became informal tenants without
clear contractual agreements. This has contributed
to uncertainty, disputes, land invasions, war-
lordism, and endemic violence.
The policy reponse to this legacy entails a commit-
ment to creating legally enforceable rights to land,
within a unitary system of registration which incor-
porates a diversity of tenure options, including
group and 'traditional' forms of tenure. However,
tenure systems must be consistent with constitu-
tionally guaranteed human rights (equality, freedom
from discrimination, due process). The Bill of
Rights within the new constitution also includes
rights to security of tenure for those whose tenure is
insecure as a result of past discrimination, or to
comparable redress. The latter provision indicates
that solutions to tenure insecurity on the vastly
overcrowded areas formerly reserved for blacks will
have to involve access to alternative land or
resources - tenure reform, in other words, includes
a land redistribution component (Department of
Land Affairs 1997).
This rights-based approach translates into a number
of activities. One is a programme of legislative
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reform which will upgrade second class rights into
full, registered ownership, with a diversity of
options as to forms of ownership and internal rules.
For many areas this will mean transferring 'state'
land to its rightful owners, on condition that con-
stitutional provisions are complied with. A second
component involves procedures and criteria for
adjudicating between competing claims in situa-
tions of overlapping and conflicting rights. Thirdly,
to prevent upgrading of rights for some leading to
massive evictions of others, protection of vulnerable
groups of occupants (tenants, farmworkers and far-
mdwellers), is needed. This requires new laws
which govern the circumstances under which land
owners can evict occupants, and which regulate
and protect the rights of tenants and other occu-
pants. Fourthly, policy needs to specify procedures
to provide alternative land to enable vulnerable
occupants to become the holders of independent
land rights - and address the underlying problem of
overcrowding.
Envisaged is an approach which puts the onus on
local stakeholders to devise and implement practi-
cal solutions to tenure disputes, and which provides
incentives to combine on-land solutions (e.g. regu-
lated occupancy rights for some) with off-land solu-
tions (such as state-financed acquisition of
alternative land) for others. Many of these policy
principles have yet to be translated into legislation
or programmes of implementation - partly because
in 1996 the Department of Land Affairs decided to
embark on a two year 'investigation and field test-
ing' phase before deciding on the final shape of its
specific proposals. This phase is still in progress.
However, some significant tenure reform laws have
been enacted since the new government assumed
office, and experience with these to date has
brought sharply into focus the problem of ensuring
that rights on paper become rights in reality
5 Law in Practice
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants Act, 3 of
1996) protects the existing rights of labour tenants
(people who provide labour to land owners in
return for the right to use portions of farms for cul-
tivation or grazing). It also makes provision for
labour tenants to acquire land (either those portions
of the farms they occupy and use, or alternative
land), using the governments Settlement/Land
Acquisition Grant which is the main financial
instrument used by land reform beneficaries for
land acquisition.
The system of labour tenancy came into being in
the nineteenth century in the wake of large scale
land grabbing by white settlers, who at the same
time suffered from a labour shortage on their farms.
It survived in two provinces, Mpumalanga and
KwaZulu-Natal, despite decades of legislation
aimed at abolishing it, and in the early 1990s it was
estimated that 30 - 40 000 families were still sub-
ject to the system (Gumbi 1996). Rendering these
contracts illegal made labour tenants highly vulner-
able to evictions by land owners - who began to
evict on a large scale following the reforms of the
1990s, in expectation of land reform measures by a
new democratic government, and in the face of
vociferous lobbying by land activist NGOs affiliated
to the National Land Committee and by the Legal
Resources Centre.
Following unsuccessful attempts in 1994 to negoti-
ate a moratorium on evictions, the new law was
drafted byJune 1995, largely by NGO activists out-
side of government3. Its content was subject to
negotiations with interest groups such as commer-
cial farming unions, and after a great deal of acri-
mony was eventually made law in 1996 (with
retrospective application to the earlier date). The
Act creates mechanisms for transforming labour
tenants into land owners, while protecting the
rights of those still operating in terms of the system.
Tenants can only be evicted when they are in breach
of their labour contract, or are guilty of misconduct,
or when the owner has specific needs for the land
they occupy or use. Evictions must follow set pro-
cedures, and must be referred by magistrates to the
Land Claims Court if the evictee can establish that
he/she falls under the Act (Department of Land
Affairs 1997: 49).
Commercial farmers saw this law as the 'thin edge
of the land reform wedge' and fought hard to dilute
the rights of labour tenants. The Act in its final form
saw major compromises being made by the Minister
of Land Affairs and by the ANC in Parliament in the
face of this strong opposition, and against the back-
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drop of the contïnued power of the commercial
farming lobby within the post-apartheid agrarian
order. Most problematic is the excessively narrow
definition of labour tenants, which makes it difficult
to defend their rights effectively; magistrates are
also interpreting the Act very conservatively There
is wide consensus that the Act is flawed, and
amendments to remedy its defects are now being
drafted.
Despite these problems, some informants feel the
Act is having a positive impact, with much fewer
evictions now taking place than before (Hathorn
pers. comm.). Others state that the Act has created
uncertainty, heightened tensions on farms, and led
to a paralysis in rural social relationships (Clacey
pers. comm.). This is partly because the redistribu-
tive component of the Act is not working at all well,
with virtually no applications for land ownership
going through. There is general agreement within
both government and the NGOs that not enough
thought was given to implementation of the Act,
with senior government officials stating that they
now see themselves as 'naive' in their approach to
rights-based laws. The NGOs somewhat belatedly
developed plans to 'push government' to imple-
ment the Act and to develop 'test cases' to set legal
precedents, but have not enacted these plans to
date.
Another problem in implementing the Act lies in its
reliance on local magistrate's courts to determine
whether or not an evictee falls within the definition
of a labour tenant (which is problematic in its defi-
nition in any case), since local magistrates, as the
NGOs have pointed out, are closely linked to com-
mercial farmers through local social networks. This
is an example of informal institutions undercutting
the formal instruments of the law, and underlines
the ways itt which laws are embedded within wider
social and political dynamics - dynamics which
were centrally important in the drawn out negotia-
tions over the specific provisions of the Act, and
will be again in the attempt to amend the Act to
strengthen the rights of labour tenants.
Some of the lessons learned from these problems
around the Labour Tenants Act are informing the
At the time there were relatively few 'new bureaucrats', Land Affairs.
drawn from the NGO sector, in the Department of
stategies of government and the NGOs in relation to
a new rights-based law currently before parliament
- the Extension of Security of Tenure Bill. This
aims to provide security of tenure for all vulnerable
occupants on farms and in pen-urban areas, regu-
lating the relationship between owners and occu-
piers and protecting the latter against unfair
evictions.4 The Bill also provides incentives for own-
ers and occupiers to create alternative arrange-
ments, usually land ownership for vulnerable
occupants, which will provide long term indepen-
dent tenure security These incentives take the form
of government subsidies for on-site or off-site set-
tlement and development.
More thought has gone into the practical implica-
tions of passing this legislation - plans are being
made to communicate the new structure of rights,
via a variety of media, to farm workers and dwellers
and tenants on black-owned land, to provide train-
ing to legal practitioners and paralegals, and to con-
tract in NGOs to provide these services on behalf of
government. NGOs linked to the National Land
Committee had undertaken a national and provin-
cial campaign to fight pre-emptive evictions from
farms and to inform and mobilise farm workers and
dwellers. The Bill makes provision for all evictions
to be automatically referred to the Land Claims
Court. Again, power dynamics will determine just
how strong the rights in the new law will be - with
the land activist NGOs at one end of the spectrum,
the farmers lobby at the other, and government
somewhere in the middle. Time will tell whether or
not the implementation measures being planned for
prove to be effective in creating tenure security
An important piece of rights-based legislation is the
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act,
31 of 1996, which was designed as an interim mea-
sure, over two years, to protect people with inse-
cure tenure rights pending longer term legislation
being put in place (Department of Land Affairs
1997: 62). The Act recognises that most people in
the former homelands, as well as in other areas such
as South African Development Trust land, despite
the fact that they occupy the land as if they were its
Evictions cari only occur in accordance with the law
and by order of Court, and if lawful, but not caused by
the conduct of the occupier, will not be permitted
unless adequate alternative accommodation is available
and there is no appropriate alternative to eviction.
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owners, and are recognised as such by their neigh-
bours, are unable to establish a clear legal right to
the land, due to the legacy of discriminatory laws
and practices and of administrative disorder
referred to above. Pending the confirmation of these
informal rights, the Act provides for defensive
mechanisms against their loss by for example, ille-
gal sales of communal land by corrupt chiefs, or
development projects initiated without consulta-
tions with the holders of the land.
Consideration is now being given to making this a
permanent piece of 'protective' legislation.
However, this Act has hardly been used since its
approval by Parliament in early 1996. Not only
have its potential beneficiaries not been informed of
its existence and the rights that it provides, but even
government officials, and especially those in depart-
ments other than Land Affairs, and those in provin-
cial governments, are barely aware of its provisions
or implications. For instance, along the undevel-
oped Wild Coast of the Eastern Cape, where eco-
tourism ventures are being touted as major
investment opportunities for foreign and local cap-
ital, this lack of awareness could have disastrous
consequences for local communities whose grazing
land, forest areas and coastal resources are now
being eyed by powerful outside interests (Kepe
1997; this Bulletin).
6 Ownership, Governance and the
Role of the Chiefs ¡n Land Tenure
South Africa's tenure reform policy framework
acknowledges that, as a result of past policies and
practices, conflicts over land rights are central and
unavoidable (Claassens 1995). It is attempting to
create procedures for the resolution of these con-
flicts through the creation of an enabling framework
of rights-conferring laws; and processes and proce-
dures which allow for negotiation and compromise.
The following types of conflict will have to be con-
fronted:
between traditional leaders and tribal members over
who are the rightful owners of 'state' or 'trust' land;
Occupiers who have lived on the land for a certain
period of time (either 10 or 20 years, still to be decided
by the legislature), and have reached a pensionable age,
or are disabled former employees, will have the right to
remain on the land.
between traditional leaders and local government
officials over land administration powers or functions;
between men (and traditional leaders in particular)
and women over gender equality in relation to land
rights;
between competing claimants to disputed tenure
rights;
between commercial farmers on the one hand, and
farm workers, farm dwellers and labour tenants, on
the other; and
between local groupings with competing visions of
the desired form of ownership, or over the content of
internal rules, or over boundaries between sub-groups.
The first three of these involve the vexed issue of
the powers of traditional leaders in contemporary
systems of tenure which, in South Africa, are
required to be consistent with the Bill of Rights.
This example illustrates well how the notion of a
'messy matrix' of institutions and entitlement rela-
tionships might be employed by analysts and policy
makers.
At the heart of the new policy framework is a dis-
tinction between 'ownership' and 'governance',
which was blurred in the past in the former home-
lands and on South African Development Trust land
where the state was both owner and administrator.
The White Paper on land policy states that 'the
Tenure Reform programme will separate these func-
tions, so that ownership can be transferred from the
state to the communities and individuals on the
land' (Department of Land Affairs 1997: 93). It also
states that:
lt will be set out in law that the members of the
landowning group will have the power to
choose the structure which represents them in
decisions pertaining to the day to day manage-
ment of the land and all issues relating to mem-
bers' access to the land asset. A majority of
members would also be able to set aside unpop-
ular decisions made by the land management
structure. (Department of Land Affairs 1997:
66)
The White Paper acknowledges that in some areas
the administration of communal tenure by chiefs
and tribal authorities is 'popular, functional and rel-
atively democratic'. However, in others it is clearly
subject to abuse, and it is intended that:
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the above measures would enable functional
and popular traditional systems to continue
operating, while providing a strong and guaran-
teed route for a majority of dissatisfied mem-
bers to replace control over land by illegitimate
structures with new democratic institutions.
(Department of Land Affairs 1997: 67)
This statement of intent cuts away at the primary
source of chiefly power and authority in the past -
control over land. This control was largely under-
mined by the colonial and apartheid regimes, but
chiefs and tribal authorities in some areas retained
important powers, and the post-apartheid era has
seen traditional leaders making a strong bid for a
much wider range of powers, including land own-
ership in so-called tribal areas.
As Mamdani (1996) points out, the fusion of judi-
cial, political and economic power in the person of
the chief is a characteristic feature, which he terms
'decentralised despotism', of the colonial (and post-
colonial) state in Africa. lt is clear that the proposed
extension of democratic rights of citizens to co-
owners of communal land constitutes a frontal
attack on this legacy, and it is not surprising that it
is being resisted so vehemently - nor that this poli-
tics of 'citizen and subject' is most vitriolic, and
often physically dangerous, in the province of
KwaZulu-Natal, the power base of the Inkatha
Freedom Party
A further complication arises from the fact that
newly elected local government structures, particu-
larly at the fourth tier of government, are contesting
the administrative powers of chiefs, as well as
attempting to take control of communal lands so
that they can implement development projects (eg.
housing projects, the building of schools, business
centres).
All of these factors mean that at present the rights,
duties, responsibilities and powers of the social
actors and institutions operating at different levels
within the matrix of communal land administration
are ambiguous, conflictful, and highly contested.
These relationships are summarised in Figure 1, a
prime example of a 'messy matrix'. Again, it is clear
that enacting the proposed law will not by itself
resolve the conflicts; it may create a framework
within which processes of 'democratisation' of land
Figure 1: Ownership and Governance in Communal Tenure:
A 'Messy Matrix' Analysis
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Groups of co-
owners
Chiefs and coun-
cils of elders
Local government
bodies
National laws
Ownership rights Policy suggests
ownership should
be vested in mem-
bers of the group;
some groups may
accept ownership
by chief or other
bodies on behalf
of group ('in
trust')
Many chiefs claim
ownership on
behalf of the
group; most are
resistant to claims
to land by local
government bod-
ies; some accept
that members are
true owners
Need to acquire
land for public
purposes; many
are resistant to
providing services
on 'privately
owned' land
Will confer rights
of ownership to
members of
groups, on condi-
tion that constitu-
tional principles
are adhered to
Administration of
land rights e.g.
allocation of plots
Could elect a rep-
resentative body
to administer; OR
could decide that
local government
administers land;
OR could accept
chief and council
as administrators
Many resist the
separation of
ownership from
governance; BUT
some accept that
their role is as
administrators not
owners
Could provide
land administra-
tion services if co-
owners decide
this is desired
Will attempt to
clearly separate
ownership from
governance
functions
Land use
decisions (e.g.
location of arable,
residential and
grazing lands)
Owners and users
could decide; OR
co-owners may
allow administra-
tors to decide
Could assist in
administration
and resolution of
boundary
disputes; OR
make decisions on
behalf of group
Assist in adminis-
tration and reso-
lution of
boundary
disputes; OR
make decisions on
behalf of group
Will provide for
rights of owners
to make decisions
on land use
Ownership of
land for public
services
Co-owners could
allow certain
lands to be alien-
ated to local
government for
purposes of ser-
vice provision
Could accept that
local government
owns land for
service provision;
many will resist
local government
owning land
Duty to provide
public services to all
citizens - currently
in dispute with
groups and tradi-
tional leaders over
land ownership
Enabling frame-
work of local
government
legislation which
needs to provide a
clear role for
traditional leaders
rights can occur, but active agents will have to press
their claims and struggle to make their rights reali-
ties. This might well require the kind of connection
between (localised) struggles over property rights
and a (wider) politics of land pointed to by
Bernstein (1997: 30).
The matrix in Figure 1 includes only formal institu-
tions - which the chieftancy and Tribal Authorities
certainly are. However, traditional leadership draws
much of its legitimate authority from its embedded-
ness in the social and cultural life of rural commu-
nities, where the discourses of tradition' and
associated cultural identity are still persuasive for
many Where not fully accepted and legitimate, tra-
ditional leaders still wield considerable informal
power over the lives of their subjects. Even strong
critics of the abuses of chieftancy, such as Levin and
Mkhabela (1997), who show that many rural peo-
ple support the democratisation of land administra-
tion, admit that a 'deep-seated respect' for the
chieftancy is widespread, and that 'popularly recog-
nised cultural rights, institutions and ceremonies'
should be respected. Kepe (1997; this Bulletin)
provides evidence of the strong interconnections
between the informal institutions, including tradi-
tional leadership at various levels, which regulate
resource use along the Wild Coast of the former
Transkei. These include patriarchal social institu-
tions, which will prove resistant to the principle of
gender equality being promoted by tenure reform
policies.
Thus the matrix would be made even more 'messy',
but also more consistent with complex realities, if
informal institutions and the strategies and prac-
tices associated with them were included within it.
As Thompson (1991: 97) remarks: 'At the iDterface
between law and agrarian practice we find custom.
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Custom itself is the interface, since it may be con-
sidered both as praxis and as law'.
7 Conclusion
What, then, are the prospects for the rights-based
laws which form such a central component of South
Africa's land reform translating into realities? This
article has suggested that there are two crucial
dimensions which need to be considered by gov-
ernment agencies, land activist organisations, and
the potential holders of these rights. One is the rela-
tionship between different kinds of formal institu-
tions, at different levels (including rights-conferring
laws, but not limited to them), as well as the com-
plex interplay between formal and informal institu-
tions in the social fields within which rights to
resources are asserted and resisted. The second is
that of strategy and tactics - of the power dynamics
through which rights are defined in law, but also in
practice. As Hunt (1991: 247) writes:
Rights take shape and are constituted by and
through struggle. Thus, they have the capacity
tô be elements of emancipation, but they are
neither a perfect nor exclusive vehicle for eman-
cipation. Rights can only be operative as con-
stituents of a strategy of social transformation as
they become part of an emergent 'common
sense' and are articulated within social prac-
tices.... They articulate a vision of entitlements,
of how things might be, which in turn has the
capacity to advance political aspiration and
action.
This 'rights without illusions' perspective suggests
that, however necessary rights-based laws are in the
South African context, they are far from sufficient;
they are, in fact, just the beginning point for an
effective politics of property rights.
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